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ROBERT J. KWORTNIK JR., W. MICHAEL LYNN, and WILLIAM T. ROSS JR.*
Marketing scholars have proposed that service employees play a
primary role in delivering service quality. However, the question of how to
motivate service employees to enhance service production has received
little research attention. The authors address this gap by advocating a
control mechanism first discussed in the economics literature—buyer
monitoring. The authors focus on a pervasive form of buyer monitoring,
voluntary tipping, and examine the effectiveness of this control
mechanism as a means for improving service in two contexts: leisure
cruises and restaurant dining. Despite a substantial interdisciplinary
literature reporting a weak relationship between customers’ perceptions
of service and their tipping behavior, the results show that a policy of
voluntary tipping has positive effects on the motivation and behavior of
service workers and on customers’ perceptions of the service those
workers provide. These findings call attention to buyer monitoring as both
a topic for academic research and a practical mechanism for motivating
service employees. The findings also call into question trends away from
tipping in service contexts, such as the cruise industry, and suggest that
many service businesses for which tipping is not viable can benefit from
alternative forms of buyer monitoring.
Keywords: buyer monitoring, tipping, service quality, employee control
mechanisms, personalized service
Buyer Monitoring: A Means to Insure
Personalized Service
The emergence of the service economy has stimulated a
wealth of research intended to help firms improve service
production. Of particular interest to marketing scholars has
been the domain of service quality—specifically, its con-
ceptualization, measurement, and management (e.g., Berry,
Parasuraman, and Zeithaml 2003; Brady and Cronin 2001;
Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985). A review of this
literature reveals that the “people” dimension of services is
of particular importance. Grönroos (1984) identifies this
factor as “functional quality” (how the service is delivered),
and Brady and Cronin (2001) use the label “interaction
quality” to reflect customers’ perceptions of their service
interactions with employees. However, although scholars
argue that this interpersonal dimension often has the
strongest influence on customers’ quality perceptions for
many services (Bitner, Booms, and Mohr 1994; Heskett,
Sasser, and Schlesinger 1997; Suprenant and Solomon
1987), empirical research in marketing that shows how to
motivate service workers and improve interaction quality is
relatively scant.
When marketing scholars examine employee motivation
and performance, they typically focus on the control
mechanisms used to motivate salespeople (Anderson 1985).
Approaching this topic from the perspectives of agency
theory (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992), transaction cost
analysis (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997), and organization
theory (Eisenhardt 1985), researchers have primarily exam-
ined behavioral and outcome control, with clan control
being a third mechanism discussed but rarely studied
(Anderson and Oliver 1987). However, these control
mechanisms are less effective in many service contexts,
such as hairstyling, restaurant dining, and travel planning,
all of which are characterized by complex, unstandardized,
and personalized interactions with customers. An alterna-
tive control mechanism is needed to ensure satisfactory
delivery of these types of services.
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Perhaps ironically, we advocate a service control mecha-
nism that requires managers to give up control—that is, to
abdicate responsibility for monitoring and rewarding serv-
ice workers to the customers being served. We propose that
customers can play an important role in service production
as de facto managers through a mechanism first discussed
in the economics literature—namely, buyer monitoring
(Jacob and Page 1980). For example, consumers of services
are often given the task of monitoring and rewarding work-
ers who served them through the custom of voluntary tip-
ping. Among the service workers commonly tipped are bar-
tenders, concierges, doormen, hairstylists, parking valets,
porters, taxi drivers, tour guides, and waiters/waitresses
(Star 1988). Estimates place the amount tipped to waiters
and waitresses in North America at $47 billion per year
(Azar 2007), so worldwide, tips given to all service
providers are substantial. Consumers’ decisions about how
much to tip are supposed to reflect their evaluations of the
service and, therefore, to provide service workers with an
incentive to deliver good service (Lynn and McCall 2000).
Thus, tipping is an important employee control mechan-
ism used to improve service quality. Surprisingly, whether
tipping—and buyer monitoring in general—actually
improves service has yet to be addressed empirically,
despite conventional wisdom in support of this idea.
We first examined this question in a preliminary study
conducted in the leisure cruise context. Recently, several
cruise lines have shifted from voluntary tipping onboard to
automatic service charges. However, before 2000, most
cruise lines had a voluntary tipping policy, under which
they encouraged cruisers to give cash-filled envelopes on
the last day of the cruise to the staff who had served them.
At that time, a few lines built tips into the price of the
cruise and then discouraged tipping and/or prohibited
employees from accepting tips. Our study capitalized on
these differences to compare the average of dining room
and cabin service ratings (on ten-point scales) for cruise
ships operating under pro-tipping policies with those oper-
ating under no-tipping policies. Data came from Ward’s
(1995) study, which provides expert ratings of service
along with other ship information. Sampling one ship per
cruise line from this data source, we found that service rat-
ings were higher for the 54 cruise ships with voluntary tip-
ping than for the 16 cruise ships with no tipping (estimated
marginal means = 7.45 versus 7.05; F(1, 61) = 5.84, p <
.02) after statistically controlling for factors potentially
related to service ratings, such as the ratio of passengers to
crew, the ratio of ship size to passengers, ship dress code,
and price category. Thus, it appears that buyer monitoring
affects service performance positively in the leisure cruise
context.
This purported positive effect of buyer monitoring on
service performance hinges on the mechanism’s ability to
motivate good service through performance-contingent
rewards. However, in the case of the most common context
for buyer monitoring, restaurant tipping, research shows an
average correlation between customers’ service ratings and
the size of the tips provided of only .2 (Lynn and McCall
2000). As Cohen (1992, p. 156) argues, this is too small to
be visible to the naked eye of the careful observer, leading
some scholars to question the incentive value of tipping
(Azar 2009; Lynn 2003; Schwartz 1997). Indeed, Azar
(2009) notes that the generally high level of service
observed in studies of tipping is surprising given that cus-
tomers’ perceptions of service are only weakly related to
the tips they leave—an apparent inconsistency he labeled
the “tipping–service puzzle.”
These interrelated issues—service quality in complex,
customizable service contexts; appropriate service control
mechanisms in such contexts; and the tipping–service
puzzle—call for theoretical and empirical treatment of a
new means to improve the service experience. We address
this call and make three contributions to the marketing
literature. First, we introduce buyer monitoring as a service
control mechanism and develop the idea proposed by
economists that buyers can sometimes monitor and reward
service workers more efficiently than firms. Second, we
offer the first empirical tests of the service-enhancing
effects of buyer monitoring, which we show not only
motivates good service but also encourages customer-
oriented service behaviors better than other service control
approaches. Third, we provide conceptual arguments and
empirical findings that resolve the tipping–service puzzle.
Specifically, we argue that the motivational effects of buyer
monitoring depend more on the perceived contingency
between the service employees believe they deliver and the
rewards they receive than on the actual contingency. We
show that despite a weak relationship between customers’
evaluations of service and their tipping behavior, the vast
majority of servers believe that they can earn much larger
tips by delivering better service. We also illustrate a form
of multimethod triangulation that yields convergent find-
ings in support of our main hypothesis.
BUYER MONITORING AS A SERVICE CONTROL
MECHANISM
The employee control mechanisms discussed in the mar-
keting and management literature streams are not well
suited for complex, highly customizable services. Behav-
ioral control, or the direct supervisory monitoring and
rewarding of employee behavior, requires specifying
desired employee behaviors as inputs to production
(Anderson and Oliver 1987; Banker et al. 1996). This is
difficult for many services because of heterogeneity in cus-
tomers’ needs and wants and in service production and
delivery. For example, one restaurant dining party might
want to be left alone, while another dining party might
want to be fawned over by the server. This customized
nature makes many services low in task programmability,
undermining the effectiveness of behavioral control
(Banker et al. 1996).
In general, outcome control, or the objective measure-
ment and rewarding of results, is more effective than
behavioral control in service contexts with low task pro-
grammability (Banker et al. 1996; Eisenhardt 1985). For
example, sales outcomes are easily measured and rewarded,
so outcome control is good for motivating speedy service,
suggestive selling, and other service behaviors that enhance
sales. In contrast, the satisfaction of customers’ more idio-
syncratic desires is difficult to measure, so outcome control
is less effective for motivating more personal and cus-
tomized service efforts.
Clan control, or the socialization of employees to iden-
tify with and be loyal to the organization, is presumably
effective in Eastern countries (e.g., Japan), where it res-
onates with communalist values, but is less popular and of
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1A modern myth often mentioned in the academic literature and popular
press is that the word TIP is an acronym for “to insure promptness.” How-
ever, fast service can be easily motivated with outcome controls, as we
show in Study 3, so tipping is not necessary to insure promptness. What
tipping does help do is to insure personalized service; thus, we suggest the
acronym TIPS.
questionable effectiveness in Western countries (e.g., the
United States), where it clashes with individualist values
(Saleh 1982). Moreover, the effort and time needed to
socialize employees make clan control difficult when
employee turnover is high (Ouchi 1979), as is the case with
many services (Hinkin and Tracey 2000). These issues sug-
gest that clan control is unlikely to offer Western service
firms assurance of good service.
We propose buyer monitoring as an alternative service
control mechanism that is appropriate in many service con-
texts, especially when task programmability, outcome
measurability, and employee retention are low (e.g., hospi-
tality services). The concept of buyer monitoring was first
introduced in the economics literature (Jacob and Page
1980) as an extension of Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972)
theory of the firm. From this economic perspective, firms
exist because they can monitor and price production inputs
more efficiently than consumers. This comparative advan-
tage enables firms to profit by contracting with input own-
ers and selling production outputs at a price that is less than
the cost to consumers of overseeing production themselves.
However, employee inputs to customized services are diffi-
cult for firms to monitor and price. Customers can often
evaluate and reward employees’ service efforts more effi-
ciently than firms, so this responsibility is left up to cus-
tomers through buyer monitoring (Azar 2004; Jacob and
Page 1980). For example, the institution of tipping is
widely used to motivate employees to deliver fast, attentive,
friendly, and personalized service. Speedy and attentive
service can also be motivated by outcome control in the
form of commissions and service charges, but if friendly
and personalized service is valued, tipping is presumed to
be more efficient and effective because it is difficult and
costly for firms to monitor and reward these latter aspects
of service.1 Other forms of buyer monitoring are uncom-
mon, but their potential exists in such exchange contexts as
travel or real estate services, in which agents are supposed
to represent the buyer when identifying products that best
meet his or her individual preferences. Many such exchange
relationships are currently structured to favor the seller,
which monitors and rewards the agent through sales com-
missions, so developing suitable forms of buyer monitoring
for these relationships would better align agent incentives
with customers’ interests.
As with traditional forms of behavioral and outcome
control, buyer monitoring relies on extrinsic incentives 
to motivate employee behavior. Studies show that
performance-based reward systems increase worker and
firm productivity (Banker et al. 1996, 2000). A key distinc-
tion between buyer monitoring and other forms of
employee control mechanisms is that buyer monitoring
leaves the decision about appropriate employee compensa-
tion to the customer, even if delivery of that compensation
is routed through the firm. Other forms of customer-
influenced employee control mechanisms are possible (e.g.,
teaching evaluations tied to merit pay, customer satisfaction
ratings tied to employee bonuses), but under these mecha-
nisms, the firm decides on the size of employee rewards
using input from customers. By taking the decision about
reward size out of customers’ hands, these other mecha-
nisms reduce customer control and, with it, some of the
incentive for workers to satisfy each individual customer.
Another key distinction between buyer monitoring and
other forms of employee control is that buyer monitoring is
typically enforced through social norms rather than legal
contracts. The idiosyncratic and often fleeting nature of
customer–employee interactions makes written and legally
binding contracting inefficient and impractical. Under
buyer monitoring, customers are expected to reward service
workers on the basis of the quality of the service provided,
but services are rendered before payment, so customers can
evaluate service any way they want and pay as little or as
much as they like; service workers have no legal recourse if
they are dissatisfied with the compensation received for
their efforts. Thus, the effectiveness of buyer monitoring,
unlike that of traditional behavioral and outcome controls,
rests on the power of social norms to ensure that buyers
actually monitor employee performance and reward it
fairly.
Some economists argue that social norms are an effec-
tive mechanism for governing behavior and improving eco-
nomic efficiency, and they point to tipping as an example
of such efficiency-enhancing norms (Azar 2005; Conlin,
Lynn, and O’Donoghue 2003). However, there is reason to
question the effectiveness of social norms to ensure that
buyers actually monitor and reward service performance
because research on tipping in restaurants, for which there
is a clear and well-known tipping norm, suggests that buy-
ers provide rewards that vary only weakly with service per-
formance. This finding has led scholars in economics (Azar
2009), services marketing (Lynn and Withiam 2008), hos-
pitality management (Lynn 2003), and tourism (Schwartz
1997) to conclude that tipping cannot be relied on to moti-
vate the delivery of good service. We propose that these
scholars have overdrawn their conclusions. Although the
relationship between service ratings and tip sizes in restau-
rant settings is weaker than expected, the relationship is
positive and statistically reliable (Lynn and McCall 2000).
Furthermore, field experiments show that server behaviors
associated with more personalized and friendly service
causally affect the tips customers leave (Lynn 2006). Thus,
there is clear evidence that buyers monitor service and
reward servers accordingly. Moreover, servers’ expectations
and motivations may lead them to perceive the relationship
between service and tip size as stronger than it actually is.
Both cultural wisdom and consumer self-reports identify
service quality as the main determinant of tip size (Adel-
man 1985; Speer 1997), so servers are likely to have 
a priori social expectations that tips are a reward for serv-
ice. Furthermore, the anthropologist Daniel Suarez (2009)
argues that service workers are motivated to perceive a
strong relationship between their service efforts and tip
rewards because they do not want to view themselves as
the undeserving recipients of charity. People tend to per-
ceive expected relationships between variables even when
those relationships are weak (Fiedler 2000) and tend to
believe that they have more control over events than they
actually do (Presson and Benassi 1996), so servers’ expec-
tations and need for control may lead them to believe that
tips are strongly affected by service. Therefore, this form of







(Constant) 3.72 2.60 .011
Food rating .55 .54 8.11 .000
Decor rating .09 .14 1.53 .129
Restaurant expensiveness .05 .30 2.87 .005
R2 = .68; F(3, 103) = 73.17, p < .001
Model 2
(Constant) 4.11 2.94 .004
Food rating .49 .48 6.97 .000
Decor rating .11 .18 1.99 .049
Restaurant expensiveness .05 .29 2.85 .005
Tipping is replaced with a
service charge –.93 –.35 2.62 .010
R2 = .70; F(4, 102) = 59.70, p < .001
Notes: Dependent measure is the Zagat rating of service quality.
Table 1
TIPPING AND HIGHER SERVICE RATINGS
buyer monitoring should increase service levels despite the
modest correlation between evaluations of service and tip
sizes observed in research. Indeed, the weak correlation
observed between customers’ service ratings and tip sizes
may in part reflect the success of tipping in reducing vari-
ability in service levels by motivating good service and
attracting and retaining good workers (Bodvarsson and
Gibson 1999).
In summary, giving customers the task of monitoring and
rewarding service delivery is believed to be an efficient
way to provide service workers with incentives to deliver
good service tailored to the idiosyncratic needs of each
customer. There are theoretical reasons to believe that
buyer monitoring motivates service workers to deliver
friendly and personalized service; however, there are also
empirical reasons to doubt these effects. Ultimately,
whether buyer monitoring actually motivates good service
is an empirical question—one that has yet to be addressed
in research. These ideas lead to our core hypothesis:
H1: Buyer monitoring motivates service employees to provide
more friendly and personalized service, which enhances
customers’ evaluations of the service provided.
We test this hypothesis along with several corollary
hypotheses in three subsequent studies with different data
sources and research methods. Study 1 replicates the
results of the preliminary study and uses cross-sectional,
correlational data to show that service ratings are better at
restaurants with a policy of voluntary tipping than at
restaurants with automatic service charges. Study 2 uses an
online survey of restaurant servers to show that most
servers believe that tips are affected by service and that the
stronger their perceptions of this service–tip contingency,
the more likely they are to engage in service-enhancing
behaviors. Study 3 uses a scenario-based experiment to
show that restaurant servers’ motivation and inclination to
provide personalized service are greater under tipping than
under service charge or service-inclusive pricing policies,
while their motivation and inclination to provide fast, sales-
enhancing service are the same under voluntary tipping and
service charge policies but lower under a service-inclusive
pricing policy. We conclude by discussing the theoretical
and practical implications of these findings along with
directions for further research.
STUDY 1
In Study 1, we assess the effects of buyer monitoring on
perceived service in the restaurant industry—specifically,
restaurants in Miami Beach, Fla. Miami attracts a large
number of international tourists who are unfamiliar with
U.S. tipping norms, so approximately 40% of restaurants in
Miami Beach replaced voluntary tipping with automatic
service charges. This enabled us to test H1 by comparing
service ratings from restaurants with voluntary tipping with
those from restaurants with service charges.
Method
Data sources. Restaurants served as the unit of analysis.
The data came from two sources: Zagat’s (2005) guide to
Miami Beach restaurants and telephone calls placed to the
restaurants in the fall of 2006. We called all 154 restaurants
with complete listings in the Zagat guide to ask about their
tipping policy. However, we dropped 47 restaurants from
the sample for various reasons (e.g., telephone numbers
were disconnected, the Zagat guide indicated unreliable
ratings due to low numbers of raters). Thus, our final sam-
ple consisted of 107 restaurants for which we had informa-
tion about tipping policies and reliable service ratings.
Variables. The dependent variable was the restaurant’s
Zagat service rating on a 30-point scale, which reflects the
following levels: 0–9 (“poor”–“fair”), 10–15 (“fair”–
“good”), 16–19 (“good”–“very good”), 20–25 (“very
good”–“excellent”), and 26–30 (“extraordinary”–
“perfection”). The main independent variable was tipping
policy (voluntary tipping or service charge). Restaurants
that added a service charge only to large parties (five or
more) were coded as having voluntary tipping. Additional
variables from the Zagat guide used as controls included
ratings of food and decor (on the same 30-point scale) and
the average estimated cost of one dinner. Because we
expected a relationship between service and price or decor
(with higher prices in more fine-dining restaurants, in
which better service is the norm) and between service and
food (with efficiently and aesthetically presented food
reflecting better service), we included these controls to iso-
late the effects of tipping policy on service by removing
other effects from the analysis.
Results
A regression of the service measure on food, decor, and
cost produced significant effects for food and restaurant
expensiveness (Table 1). More important, adding a tipping
policy to the model significantly improved the model’s
R-square (ΔR2 = .02; F(1, 102) = 6.84, p = .01). Restau-
rants with voluntary tipping had higher average service rat-
ings than restaurants with service charges (estimated mar-
ginal means = 19.46 versus 18.54; t(102) = 2.62, one-tailed
p < .01). This finding echoes the results from the prelimi-
nary study and indicates that the improvement in perceived
service produced by buyer monitoring generalizes across at
least some industries. However, the use of perceived serv-
ice as a dependent measure means that we cannot be sure
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Table 2
POSITIVE SERVICE BEHAVIORS OF SERVERS WHO
PERCEIVE A SERVICE–TIP CONTINGENCY
Behavior n r
Calling customers by name 1170 .16**
Touching customers 1166 .15**
Smiling at customers 1166 .15**
Attempts at suggestive selling 1161 .14**
Telling customers jokes or stories 1164 .11**
Complimenting customers’ food choices 1157 .10**
Introducing oneself by name 1170 .06*
Repeating customers orders back to them 1167 .02
Writing “Thank You” on the back of checks 1166 –.02
Mean frequency of positive service behaviors 1171 .17**
*p < .05 (two-tailed).
**p < .005 (two-tailed).
Notes: Correlations are between ratings of frequency of each behavior
and ratings of the effect of service quality on tip size.
that tipping improved actual server motivation and/or serv-
ice delivery. Consumers believe that tipping offers an
incentive to deliver good service (Mills and Riehle 1987),
so they may use a tipping policy as a cue when evaluating
their service experiences. In other words, voluntary tipping
may have a direct effect on perceptions and evaluations of
service that is independent of its effects on employee moti-
vation and behavior. Studies 2 and 3 provide more direct
evidence that voluntary tipping improves service and not
just consumers’ perceptions of service.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we examine the idea that tipping motivates
employees to deliver better service, which rests on their
perception that rewards are contingent on the service they
deliver. To the extent that workers believe that they will
receive larger tips for better service, they should be more
willing to do the things necessary to satisfy customers. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Service employees working under a buyer-monitoring sys-
tem who believe that customer rewards vary strongly with
service engage in positive service behaviors more often
than employees who believe that customer rewards vary
only weakly with service.
Method
Data source. Restaurant servers completed an online sur-
vey about their experiences on and opinions of the job. We
recruited participants by sending invitations to students, to
members of commercial consumer lists (DataCorp) and
panels (Zoomerang) who indicated that they were servers,
and to people on Facebook and MySpace.com whose pro-
files indicated that they were servers. We also asked for
recruitment help from industry managers, Web sites that
attract servers (e.g., http://www.waiterrant.net), and survey
respondents. We retained data from 1189 current servers
across 48 states in the United States for analysis.
Variables. We obtained responses to the following meas-
ures: (1) perceived service–tip contingency: ratings of
servers’ beliefs about the effect of the quality of service
delivered on tip size (five-point scale: 1 = “very small
effect,” 3 = “medium size effect,” and 5 = “very large
effect”); (2) service behavior index: average rating of how
often the server engaged in nine positive service behaviors
(Lynn 2003), such as introducing oneself by name to cus-
tomers and telling customers jokes or stories (four-point
scale: 1 = “never,” 2 = “sometimes,” 3 = “often,” and 4 =
“all the time”); (3) comparative tip: rating of perceived tip
size relative to tips earned by coworkers (seven-point scale:
1 = “much smaller than most others’ tips,” 4 = “about the
same as most others’ tips,” and 7 = “much larger than most
others’ tips”); and (4) restaurant bill size: average per-
person bill size at the restaurant where the server works.
Results
Only 13% of survey respondents reported that service
had a small or very small effect on tips, 37% reported that
service had a medium effect, and 50% reported that service
had a large or very large effect. Thus, a substantial majority
of servers perceived a meaningful contingency between the
service they deliver and the tips they receive, which stands
in stark contrast to the weak relationship reported in the lit-
erature between customers’ evaluations of service and the
tips they provide (Lynn and McCall 2000). Moreover,
servers’ perceptions of the strength of the service–tip con-
tingency were significantly and positively correlated with
the average frequency of positive service behaviors they
perform (r = .17, n = 1171, p < .001). Separate analyses for
each service behavior produced similar results (Table 2).
These findings support H2, as well as our resolution of the
tipping–service puzzle.
The positive correlation between the perceived service–
tip contingency and the service behavior index supports the
idea that the perceived contingency motivates good service.
Yet it could also be due to a reverse causal effect because
the service behaviors included in the index are known to
increase tips (Lynn 2003). Therefore, servers who fre-
quently perform these behaviors should earn larger tips
than coworkers who perform the behaviors less often, and
this difference in tip income could drive perceptions of the
service–tip contingency. Furthermore, the relationship
between the perceived service–tip contingency and service
behaviors could be due to the confounding effects of
restaurant expensiveness. Many acts in the service behavior
index are too informal for high-end restaurants, so servers
working at these restaurants may be less likely to engage in
these behaviors. Servers at such restaurants might also per-
ceive a weaker service–tip contingency either because there
is less variability in service at these restaurants or because
social pressures to tip at these restaurants undermine the
actual service–tip contingency.
To address these alternative explanations, we regressed
the service behavior index on comparative tips, restaurant
bill size, and perceived service–tip contingency (Table 3).
This analysis produced significant effects for comparative
tips but not for restaurant expensiveness. More important, it
produced a significant effect for the perceived service–tip
contingency (B = .07, t(1152) = 4.40, p < .001). The rela-
tionship between perceived service–tip contingency and the
service behavior index remained significant even after we
controlled for these factors, thus ruling out the reverse
causality and confounding explanations. Other explanations






(Constant) 2.61 29.75 .000
Server’s tip income (relative 
to coworkers) .08 .16 5.20 .000
Restaurant bill size .00 –.04 –1.29 .186
Perceived service–tip
contingency .07 .13 4.40 .000
Notes: Dependent measure is index of rated frequency of nine positive
service behaviors. R2 = .05, N = 1156, F = 20.81, p < .001 (two-tailed).
Table 3
EFFECT OF PERCEIVED SERVICE–TIP CONTINGENCY ON
SERVICE BEHAVIOR INDEX (AFTER CONTROLLING FOR TIP
INCOME AND RESTAURANT EXPENSIVENESS)
are possible, but these are the most plausible, and they are
not responsible for the observed relationship. Although
causal interpretations of correlational data are always
uncertain, the results of this study support the idea that the
performance-contingent nature of tipping motivates servers
to deliver better service.
The correlations in Study 2 provide evidence for an
incentive effect of tipping but cannot be used to assess the
size of the effect. If fewer servers believed that tips varied
with service, the counterfactual would increase variance in
the perceived service–tip contingency, thus increasing the
size of its correlations with server behaviors, but the coun-
terfactual would also diminish the incentive effect of tip-
ping. To assess the size of the incentive effect, it is neces-
sary to compare the motivation and behavior of servers
under voluntary tipping with those of servers under other
policies. We designed Study 3 to permit such an assess-
ment. In addition, Study 3 allows for stronger causal infer-
ences than those afforded by the previous studies. The
study also enables us to test an important boundary condi-
tion of buyer-monitoring effects on service—namely, that
buyer monitoring improves customer-oriented service more
than sales-oriented service when compared with other
forms of outcome control.
STUDY 3
In Study 3, we use a scenario-based, role-playing experi-
ment to test the effects of buyer monitoring on self-
reported employee motivation and behavior. Several hun-
dred current or former waiters and waitresses read a
scenario describing a restaurant work situation that differed
with regard to compensation system: voluntary tipping by
the customers they serve, a service charge based on the size
of the bill instead of voluntary tipping, or higher wages
with no tipping. After reading the scenario to which they
had been randomly assigned, participants rated their likely
motivation levels and behaviors under that scenario.
This experimental design allowed for causal inferences
about the processes underlying buyer monitoring as an
employee control mechanism and an assessment of the
magnitude of effects on server motivation and behavior. In
addition, Study 3 tested an important boundary condition
for buyer monitoring. Recall the theoretical argument that
buyer monitoring should improve server motivation and
effort to personalize and customize service because low
task programmability and outcome measurability make
other ways of controlling these aspects of service (here-
inafter, we refer to this as “customer-oriented service”)
ineffective or inefficient. However, sales-oriented aspects
of service can be efficiently motivated by outcome controls
in the form of sales commissions or service charges, so tip-
ping or other forms of buyer monitoring should be less
effective at improving worker motivation and effort to
engage in sales-oriented behaviors when such outcome
controls are in place. Indeed, such outcome controls may
be more efficient than buyer monitoring in motivating
sales-oriented service behavior, such as suggestive selling
and fast service. In the absence of such outcome controls,
however, buyer monitoring is better than no employee con-
trol mechanism and should enhance sales-oriented motiva-
tion and behavior. This reasoning leads to the following
hypotheses:
H3: Customer-oriented service motivation and behavior are
greater under a buyer-monitoring policy than under a serv-
ice charge or a wages-only policy.
H4: Sales-oriented service motivation and behavior under a
buying-monitoring policy are the same or lower than under
a service charge policy but are greater than under a wages-
only policy.
Method
Participants. Current and former restaurant servers were
recruited for this experiment by asking a blogger who is
popular among waitstaff (the Waiter at www.waiterrant.net)
to post a link to the online experiment and encourage his
readers with restaurant work experience to participate. We
offered participants an opportunity to win one of several
$100 Amazon.com gift certificates in exchange for their
time and effort. A total of 469 current or former restaurant
servers participated in the study. Of these participants, 66%
were female, 35% were under the age of 25, 37% were
ages 25 to 34, 18% were ages 35 to 44, and the rest were
age 45 or older. Some participants failed to answer every
question, so the samples sizes vary slightly across the
analyses.
Stimuli and manipulations. We randomly presented the
participants with one of six scenarios that described a
restaurant work situation (for additional information, see
the Web Appendix at http://www.marketingpower.com/
jmroct09). The different versions of the scenario reflected
manipulations of the compensation system (tipping versus
service charges based on bill size versus wages) and mana-
gerial supervision (low versus high supervision). The
managerial supervision manipulation had no significant
main or interaction effects on the dependent measures, so
we collapsed across this factor in the analyses. After read-
ing the scenario, participants were instructed to think about
what it would be like to be a server at this restaurant. Next,
they completed the dependent measures, manipulation
checks, and other measures, which we describe in greater
detail subsequently.
Dependent measures. Participants indicated on a seven-
point scale (1 = “not motivated,” and 7 = “very motivated”)
how motivated they would be under the scenario described
to engage in a variety of service behaviors. These items









How motivated would you be to provide
friendly, enthusiastic service to your
customers at this restaurant? .87
How motivated would you be to ask about and
remember the individualized requests of your
customers at this restaurant? .80
How motivated would you be to modify your
service routine to accommodate your
customers’ individual needs and wants at this
restaurant? .78
How motivated would you be to amuse and
entertain your customers at this restaurant? .76
How motivated would you be to try to increase
per-check dollar sales from your customers at
this restaurant? 1.04
How motivated would you be to try to provide
fast service to your customers to turn more
tables at this restaurant? .67
Service Behavior Items
Visit the table to ask your customers if they are
enjoying their meal. .81
Smile at your customers. .77
Ask your customers about their tastes and
preferences to then recommend dishes. .73
Make unobtrusive passes by the table to observe
your customers’ needs. .73
Flirt or joke with your customers to entertain
them. .68
Compliment your customers on their meal
selections. .67
Add special garnishes to plates to make them
more appealing to your customers. .65
Ask your customers questions about themselves
to develop stronger relationships with them. .64
Thank your customers for their business either
verbally or in writing on the check. .64
Ask the chef to prepare something off the menu
for a customer who requests it. .64
Learn and use your customers’ names. .61
Permit your customers to substitute items in an
entrée, even if the kitchen does not like to do
it. .58
Introduce yourself by name to your customers to
be friendly. .55
Recommend specials and dishes with higher
prices as your “favorites.” .87
Attempt to up-sell your customers by suggesting
additional (e.g., appetizers) or larger options
(e.g., doubles). .84
Speed up the order and delivery process to turn
tables more quickly. .81
Suggest branded selections (e.g., Bacardi) when
your customers order unbranded choices. .71
Avoid suggesting dishes to your customers that
take longer for the kitchen to prepare. .61
Ask for another server’s help to clear your tables
to make them available quicker. .60
Volunteer to serve large parties. .59
Notes: Pattern matrices are from separate factor analyses on motiva-
tional and behavioral items using generalized least squares as communali-
ties and Promax rotation of two factors.
Table 4
STUDY 3: FACTOR LOADINGS OF MOTIVATIONAL AND
BEHAVIORAL MEASURES 
oriented service motivation” and “customer-oriented serv-
ice motivation” (see Table 4). We averaged the items that
loaded highly on each of these factors to form indexes with
Cronbach’s alphas of .85 and .88, respectively.
Next, participants indicated on a seven-point scale (1 =
“not frequently,” and 7 = “very frequently”) how often they
would perform 21 different service actions. All but one of
these items loaded on one of two factors, which we labeled
“customer-oriented service behaviors” and “sales-oriented
service behaviors” (see Table 4). Customer-oriented service
behaviors focused on providing friendlier and more cus-
tomized service. Sales-oriented service behaviors focused
on moving customers in and out more quickly (thus
increasing the number of tables the server could serve) or
increasing the size of the bill. We averaged the items load-
ing highly on each of these factors to form indexes that had
Cronbach’s alphas of .91 and .88, respectively. We dropped
the one item that did not load on either factor.
Manipulation checks. After completing the dependent
measures, participants indicated how much they thought
their pay would be affected by tips and sales. We also col-
lected additional manipulation checks, a measure of atti-
tude toward service, and demographic data, but these added
little value, and thus we do not report them here for the
sake of brevity and clarity.
Results
Separate analyses of variance indicated that our manipula-
tion of the tipping policy significantly affected the perceived
dependence of pay on tips (F(2, 463) = 159.84, p < .001)
and perceived dependence of pay on sales (F(2, 463) =
181.61, p < .001). Post hoc comparisons using least signifi-
cant differences tests indicated that participants perceived
the tip policy manipulations as intended (Table 5). First,
participants rated the dependence of pay on tips as signifi-
cantly higher under the voluntary tipping condition than
under the service charge condition and significantly higher
under the latter condition than under the wages-only condi-
tion. Although we expected the perceived dependence of
pay on tips to be comparable under the service charge and
wages-only conditions, the significant difference between
these conditions is understandable if some of the servers
interpreted service charges as automatic tips. Second, par-
ticipants rated the dependence of pay on sales as signifi-
cantly higher under the service charge condition than under
the voluntary tipping condition and significantly higher
under the latter condition than under the wages-only condi-
tion. This is an expected pattern of results because sales has
a more reliable effect on pay under service charges, a less
reliable but meaningful effect on pay under tipping, and no
effect on pay under wages-only compensation.
Separate analyses of variance indicated that the tipping
policy manipulation significantly affected customer-
oriented service motivation (F(2, 466) = 33.29, p < .001)
and behavior (F(2, 466) = 29.20, p < .001), as well as
sales-oriented service motivation (F(2, 466) = 254.57, p <
.001) and behavior (F(2, 466) = 173.01, p < .001). Consis-
tent with H3, customer-oriented service motivation and
behavior were both significantly higher under the voluntary
tipping condition than under the service charge and the
wages-only condition (Table 5). Consistent with H4, sales-
oriented service motivation and sales-oriented service














































Notes: Means within each row with different superscripts are signifi-
cantly different from one another at the .05 level (two-tailed). Those with
the same superscript are not significantly different from one another.
Table 5
VOLUNTARY TIPPING PRODUCES HIGH LEVELS OF
CUSTOMER-ORIENTED AND SALES-ORIENTED SERVICE
behavior were comparable across the voluntary tipping and
service charge conditions and were significantly higher
under the voluntary tipping than under the wages-only
condition.
To test H3 and H4 further, we standardized customer- and
sales-oriented service motivation and entered them into a
mixed between/within analysis of variance with tipping
versus service charge as a between-subjects variable. We
performed a similar analysis on customer- and sales-
oriented behavior. These analyses produced significant
interactions between tipping policy and service dimension
as implied by the hypotheses (F(1, 309) = 41.71 and 26.17
for motivation and behavior, respectively, p < .001). With
service charges as the comparison condition, voluntary tip-
ping improved customer-oriented service motivation and
behavior significantly more than it improved sales-oriented
service motivation and behavior (Table 5).
The results of this study demonstrate that compensation
policies causally affect the self-reported service motivation
and behavior of restaurant servers. Customer-oriented serv-
ice motivation and behavior increased by approximately
half a standard deviation under voluntary tipping compared
with service charges and increased by an even larger
amount under voluntary tipping compared with wages only.
In addition, the results support a boundary condition for
buyer-monitoring effects on service. Theoretically, buyer
monitoring should be most effective when both behavioral
and outcome controls are weak. Service charges represent a
strong outcome control for sales-oriented service but a
weak outcome control for customer-oriented service. Thus,
our finding that voluntary tipping improved customer-
oriented service motivation and behavior, but not sales-
oriented service motivation and behavior compared with a
service charge policy, supports this theoretical boundary
condition for buyer-monitoring effects.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This investigation applies a multimethod approach
across studies that use different data sources, designs, and
contexts to triangulate on the effectiveness of buyer moni-
toring as a control mechanism to improve personalized
service. Specifically, we find consistent evidence that buyer
monitoring in the form of tipping positively affects work-
ers’ motivation to perform service-enhancing behaviors and
customers’ perceptions of service. We discuss the theoreti-
cal and practical implications of these findings along with
directions for further research.
The Tipping–Service Puzzle
The results of our studies highlight an erroneous con-
clusion in the literature on tipping. Using the small correla-
tion between customers’ perceptions of service and the tips
they leave as a basis, several scholars have concluded that
tipping is unlikely to motivate good service (Azar 2009;
Lynn 2003; Schwartz 1997). This conclusion underlies the
puzzle identified by Azar (2009) that restaurant service lev-
els are high despite research showing that tips are only
weakly related to customers’ service ratings. We help solve
this tipping–service puzzle by arguing that the incentive
value of tipping depends more on the perceived than the
actual relationship between the service delivered and tips
earned. Servers’ expectations and illusions of control may
lead them to perceive the service–reward relationship as
stronger than it actually is; therefore, tipping provides an
incentive for the delivery of good service. Our findings that
the majority of servers believe that their tips are strongly
affected by the service they deliver, that perceptions of this
service–tipping contingency are related to servers’ delivery
of personalized service, and that voluntary tipping policies
enhance employee motivation and performance support this
reasoning.
Importantly, the observed effects of tipping policies on
employee motivation and performance were large enough
to be practically and theoretically meaningful. Voluntary
tipping enhanced rated service by approximately one-half
and one-third standard deviations in the preliminary study
and Study 1, respectively, and enhanced customer-oriented
service motivation and behavior by about a half a standard
deviation (or more) in Study 3. Thus, managers in service
industries should think twice before abandoning voluntary
tipping policies.
The consequences of tipping extend beyond its effects on
customer-oriented service motivation and behavior. On the
positive side, tipping plays a direct role in the customer
experience, and customers prefer tipping over service
charges (Lynn and Withiam 2008). Tips are also a way to
separate the price of service from the price of accompany-
ing products (e.g., meals, lodging), so they are also a form
of price partitioning that may reduce consumer perceptions
of expensiveness (Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998).
This partitioning of prices also lowers nominal prices for
the accompanying products, which reduces costs when
channels of distribution are paid a percentage of sales (e.g.,
travel agents). Finally, tipping allows different customers to
pay different prices for the same service, so it is a form of
price discrimination, which can increase profits (see Lynn
and Withiam 2008; Schwartz 1997). On the negative side,
tipping can motivate problematic behaviors, such as (1) dis-
crimination against groups believed to be poor tippers, (2)
collusion with customers against the firms’ interest by giv-
ing goods and services free of charge, (3) refusal to attend
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to other servers’ customers, and (4) shirking of collective
tasks, such as backstage preparation and cleanup (Lynn and
Withiam 2008). Thus, pros and cons to the use of tipping
exist, and managers must weigh these considerations when
deciding on compensation policies.
Buyer Monitoring as an Employee Control Mechanism
In addition to clarifying the tipping–service puzzle, our
findings support the efficacy of buyer monitoring as an
employee control mechanism that is particularly suitable
for motivating friendly, personalized service. Marketing
scholars have argued that the interaction between workers
and customers is important for overall service quality but is
difficult for service firms to control when different cus-
tomers want different types of interactions with employees.
If the firms’ interests in delivering personalized service
align with the customers’ interests in receiving such serv-
ice, firms can enlist the customers’ help in monitoring and
rewarding employees. Our finding that tipping improves
customized services in restaurant contexts, in which the
relationship between service ratings and tip size is typically
weak, provides empirical support for the efficacy of tip-
ping. As an employee control mechanism effective at
enhancing an important and difficult-to-control aspect of
service quality, buyer monitoring deserves more attention
from marketing scholars. In particular, research is needed
to identify and study other forms and consequences of
buyer monitoring and the conditions that affect firms’ use
of buyer monitoring.
Other forms of buyer monitoring. Tipping, which involves
direct customer monitoring of workers and rewarding their
performance with voluntary gifts of money, is an efficient,
pure form of buyer monitoring. There are other potential
forms of buyer monitoring and rewarding of worker behav-
ior, but rewards do not to come directly from the cus-
tomer’s pocket. For example, customers receiving multiple
services from a team of workers could reward the team
with money from a pool the customers fund and agree will
be split according to the service each worker rendered. In
cases involving smaller teams or solitary service workers,
something similar could be achieved by having customers
distribute funds between the employees and a third party
(e.g., a charity) identified as a potential recipient if cus-
tomers deem service performance to be inadequate. In both
cases, the customers are rewarding employees with money
they no longer consider theirs because they precommit to
giving it away. The main benefit of these forms of buyer
monitoring is the provision of a strong incentive for
employees to satisfy the customer while reducing the cus-
tomer’s incentive to underreward employees, as can happen
with tipping. This assurance would be especially valuable
when the total reward a customer provides is large, either
because many workers are involved (e.g., catered events,
conventions) or because the value of the service is substan-
tial (e.g., commissions paid to real-estate buyers’ agents).
Another approach to buyer monitoring is for firms to
build the cost of service into prices and let customers dis-
tribute to workers claims to some of the money as a reward
for service. For example, Southwest Airlines has tried
something similar by providing its frequent fliers with
stickers to give to meritorious employees (Thomas 2008).
Employees used the stickers as entries into a lottery (whose
prizes ultimately came from airfares), so each sticker was a
reward to the employees who received them. This form of
buyer monitoring allows customers to determine how much
each employee is rewarded relative to coworkers, thus pre-
serving the incentive to satisfy customers. The firm can
also mask the total rewards distributed to employees collec-
tively, which permits the firm to charge more for employ-
ees’ labor than it pays them and thus retain any funds not
distributed in the form of customer-granted claims to
employees.
Although these alternative forms of buyer monitoring are
rare, they constitute an important area for further research.
Certainly, there is a need for better ways to motivate
customer-oriented behavior from service workers such as
travel agents, real-estate brokers, and financial advisors
who receive supplier-paid commissions on sales. Commis-
sions give service workers larger rewards the higher the
price customers pay, so they are a poor way to motivate
workers to keep the best interest of the customer in mind.
Other incentive schemes are needed to insure personalized
service, and new forms of buyer monitoring may provide
the needed incentives.
Other consequences of buyer monitoring. Although our
research focuses on the effects of buyer monitoring on the
delivery and customer perceptions of personalized service,
buyer monitoring is a complex control mechanism that is
likely to have other effects. For example, in addition to
providing an incentive to deliver good service, buyer moni-
toring may selectively attract more competent and moti-
vated service workers. Conversely, it also may cause dele-
terious effects, such as encouraging workers to discriminate
against some customers, undermining workers’ job satis-
faction and retention due to conflicts of interest, and reduc-
ing workers’ willingness to cooperate with coworkers and
help with team processes that are necessary for service
production.
First, effective buyer monitoring should lead to good
performers earning more than less competent and moti-
vated workers. Thus, firms that use buyer monitoring
should attract and retain workers who believe in their own
competence and/or are motivated by performance-
contingent rewards. Although such selection effects have
received little attention in marketing, research in other dis-
ciplines indicates that such effects are an important source
of performance improvement caused by contingent com-
pensation (Banker et al. 2000; Bouwens and Van Lent
2006; Harrison, Virick, and William 1996). Thus, testing
the selection effects of buyer monitoring is a potential idea
for further research.
Second, buyer monitoring provides an incentive to focus
service on customers who leave large tips or service-
contingent tips while discriminating against others (Lynn
and Withiam 2008). In a restaurant context, groups per-
ceived as poor tippers and likely to receive inferior service
include blacks, foreigners, teenagers, the elderly, and cou-
pon users (Ayres, Vars, and Zakariya 2005; Harris 1995;
Lynn 2004). This potential discrimination in service delivery—
and the means for mitigating it—deserves more research
attention.
Third, buyer monitoring places employees under the
control of multiple masters. Workers must satisfy manage-
ment and simultaneously satisfy multiple buyer monitors
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whose demands may conflict with one another or with
those of management. Thus, buyer monitoring increases
role conflict (Eddleston, Kidder, and Litsky 2002; Shamir
1983), which may produce deleterious effects on job satis-
faction and retention (Hartline and Ferrell 1996; Singh,
Goolsby, and Rhoads 1994). Effects of increased role con-
flict may be mitigated by the higher incomes earned by top
performers under buyer monitoring (Lynn and Withiam
2008), but this issue needs to be empirically explored.
Finally, buyer monitoring rewards workers for service
behaviors directed at and visible to their own customers but
provides employees with a disincentive to help coworkers
and to engage in important but less visible collective serv-
ice tasks (Lynn and Withiam 2008). These disincentives
and the ways to minimize them should be conceptually and
empirically studied. For example, Barkan and colleagues
(2004) find that pooling tips decreases competitive feelings
among servers and, as long as workers can observe one
another’s efforts, increases service levels. Further research
along these lines is needed.
Determinants of the use of buyer monitoring. Another
direction for further research is to develop and test a theory
on the conditions under which buyer monitoring is or
should be used by firms. For example, building on the eco-
nomic efficiency argument for buyer monitoring, Azar
(2005) hypothesizes that tipping should be more common
for occupations that customers can easily monitor (i.e.,
those with a large personal or social component and an eas-
ily assessed technical or professional component to the
job). An analysis of tipped and nontipped service occupa-
tions does not support Azar’s hypothesis, but additional
research using different operationalizations of buyer-
monitoring ability and prevalence of tipping, as well as dif-
ferent occupations, is needed before definitive conclusions
about that hypothesis can be drawn. In addition, other
propositions about the conditions that promote the use of
buyer monitoring need to be developed and tested.
Conclusion
As marketing scholarship and practice evolve toward a
service-centric model of marketing exchange (Vargo and
Lusch 2004), interdisciplinary, theory-driven research is
needed to offer new perspectives and to expand the bound-
aries of extant principles and thought. Our adoption of the
concept of buyer monitoring from economics and our evi-
dence regarding its effectiveness are consistent with this
research tradition. We offer insights from our multimethod
studies and take the service-centric paradigm shift one step
further by focusing on the role of consumers as de facto
managers of service production, especially for services that
are more complex and idiosyncratic. Marketers claim that
“the customer is king.” Now they need to acknowledge 
that the customer can also be the manager or the “buyer
monitor.”
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